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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The evidence presented in this papersupports the view that many
Americans, particularly those without acollege education, save too little.
Our analysis also indicates that itshould be possible to increase total
personal saving among lower incomehouseholds by encouraging the
formation and expansion of privatepension plans. It is doubtful that
favorable tax treatment of capital incomewould stimulate significant
additional saving by this group. Conversely,the expansion of private
pensions would probably have littleeffect on saving by higher income
households. However, these households are morelikely to increase sav-
ing significantly in response tofavorable tax treatment of capital income.
Currently, eligibility for IRAs is linked to anAGI cap, and pension
coverage is more common amonghigher income households than
among low incomehouseholds. The most effective system for pro-
moting personal saving wouldhave precisely the opposite features.
Extending tax incentives for saving to higherincome households is prob-
lematic. We discuss three competingpolicy options, WAs with ACT
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caps, the universal IRA, and the Premium Saving Account (PSA). Our
analysis reveals that the PSA system isa more cost-effective vehicle for
providing saving incentives to all households,particularly those in the
top quintile of the income distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1980s, low rates of national savingin the United States have
generated an enormous amount ofconcern among both economists and
policy makers. Proposals to address theseconcerns fall into two broad
categories. One category consists of policies designedto increase public
saving; the other consists of policies thatare intended to promote private
saving. The first category is synonymous with deficitreduction, while the
second includes tax incentives, pension policy, andstrategies for discour-
aging the use of private debt. Some economistsargue that deficit reduc-
tion is the most reliable and efficacious method ofincreasing national
saving (see, e.g., Summers, 1985), while othersmaintain that it is essen-
tial to restore adequate rates of saving in theprivate sector (see, e.g.,
Bernheim, 1991). To evaluate the merits ofstrategies that target private
saving, one must resolve two issues. First, aside fromthe obvious fact that
private saving is one component of national saving,are there reasons to
be concerned about the rate of private saving? Second,are there any
effective and reliable methods of promoting privatesaving?
This paper investigates several factualmatters bearing on both of
these questions. Four central findingsemerge from our analysis. First,
many households do not save enough to provide themselves withade-
quate financial security and, as a result, will be forcedto accept signifi-
cantly reduced standards of living during retirement.This phenomenon
is especially prevalent when the head of the householdlacks a college
education. Second, patterns of asset accumulationamong those without
college education bear little orno resemblance to the patterns that
emerge from standard economic theories. In contrast, those witha col-
lege education not only savemore adequately for retirement, but also
generally behave in a way that more closely resembles"textbook" life
cycle planning. Third, consistent with this secondfinding, employer-
provided pensions do not appear to displace otherpersonal saving in
cases where the head of the household lacks a college education. How-
ever, for college-educated households, pensions doappear to crowd out
private saving. Fourth, it is likely that high-income householdsrespond
more vigorously to tax incentives for saving than do moderate- and low-
income households.
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extent that many households preparepoorly for retirement, there is
cause to be concernedabout the rate of personal saving per se. Although
lower-income households may notrespond significantly to tax incen-
tives, it should be possible to stimulate ratesof saving among this group
by encouraging the creation and expansionof private pension plans. For
high-income households, the implications arereversed: although pen-
sions displace other forms of saving, taxincentives for saving are proba-
bly efficacious.
Because eligibility for deductiblecontributions to Individual Retire-
ment Accounts (IRAs) is subject to anadjusted gross earnings (ACT) cap,
lower-income households currently receivethe most favorable tax incen-
tives for saving. Conversely, householdswith higher levels of income
and education are much more likely to becovered by private pensions.
Thus, the current system appears to bedesigned in a way that mini-
mizes the impact of public policy onpersonal saving.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to modify the current systemin a way that
would extend tax incentives to higher-incomehouseholds without rais-
ing a host of new problems. The most commonproposals are either to
drop the ACT cap on IRAs or to design some new,"universal IRA"
system without an AGI cap. Theefficacy of these proposals is question-
able. For many high-income households,saving for retirement may al-
ready exceed the proposed contribution limits;in that case, an IRA does
not offer any reward for incrementalsaving. To the extent that IRAs
simply generate windfall gains for manywealthy individuals, the sys-
tem would be perceived asinequitable. Finally, the expansion of IRA
eligibility could significantly reduce publicsaving (increase federal defi-
cits) and thereby defeat the purpose of theproposal.
An alternative method of extending taxincentives for saving to
higher-income households is through a systemof Premium Savings Ac-
counts (PSA5) (see Bernheim and Scholz,1992). In brief, a household
becomes eligible to contribute to a PSAonly when its total saving ex-
ceeds a minimum threshold (the floor);beyond that point, incremental
saving may be placed into a PSA, up to a cap(the ceiling). These floors
and ceilings are tied to ACT: higher-incomehouseholds must save more
before becoming eligible.
If one believes that it is desirable toprovide high-income households
with tax incentives for saving, does thePSA proposal offer an attractive
alternative to universal IRAs? To answer thisquestion, we undertake a
comparison of the two proposals. Foreach proposal, we calculate an
index of effectiveness and a measure ofwindfalls received by higher-
income individuals. We also assess therelative budgetary costs of these
proposals. Our analysis suggests that, relative to auniversal IRA sys-76Bernheim and Scholz
tern, the PSA proposal would significantly enhance incentivesto save
arnong higher-income households even as it would reduce both budget-
ary costs and windfalls to the wealthy.
This paper is organized as follows: section IIpresents evidence on the
adequacy of personal saving; section III examines evidenceon the effec-
tiveness of pension policy; section IV discusses the impact oftax incen-
tives for saving; and section V concludes.
II. THE ADEQUACY OF PERSONAL SAVING
According to common wisdom, Americansconsume too much and save
too little. This impression is largely traceable to widely publicizedstatis-
tics on aggregate personal saving. International comparisonsreveal that
U.S. households save significantly less than their foreigncounterparts.
Between 1980 and 1989, Americans saved (net) 7.4% of disposableper-
sonal income, compared with 11.4% for OECD Europe and16.0% for
Japan (OECD, 1989). Moreover, since the mid-1980s, therate of house-
hold saving in the United States has been well below its historicalaver-
age (see Figure 1).
Although these statistics raise legitimateconcerns, they do not pro-
vide definitive evidence of a problem. As measured,personal saving
excludes capital gains. Thus, households could in principleaccumulate
wealth at a rapid rate even when measured saving is low.Rates of
personal saving can also vary across both time and countries forreasons
unrelated to the adequacy of saving considered from theperspective of
individual households. To understand this second point,consider the
following hypothetical example. Envision two countries, A andB, that
are identical in all respects, except that the elderly make upa larger
fraction of the population in A than in B. Because householdstend to
accumulate wealth prior to retirement and decumulate wealththere-
after, one would expect to observe a higher rate ofaggregate personal
saving in country B. Indeed, in an economy withno growth in either
population or productivity, dissaving by retirees could completelyoffset
saving by workers: one could in principle observeno personal saving in
the aggregate, regardless of how well individual householdsprepared
for retirement. Thus, ultimately,one can only judge the adequacy of
personal saving by examining microeconomic dataon the behavior of
individual households.
Generally, the available evidence suggests that U.S. workers havepre-
pared poorly for retirement. According to Diamond (1977), duringthe
1960s roughly 40% of married couples andover 50% of unmarried indi-
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FIGURE 1. The Rate of Personal Saving,National Income Accounts.
from assets. At age sixty, nearly 30% ofmiddle-class individuals lacked
sufficient wealth to replace two years' worth of income.Similarly, Ham-
mermesh (1984) concluded that, during the 1970s, mostelderly individu-
als failed to accumulate resources sufficient tosustain their accustomed
standards of living. Indeed, consumption shortlyafter retirement ex-
ceeded the highest sustainable level of consumptionby an average of
14%. Hammermesh found that, within a few yearsof retirement, most
households were forced to reduce their expendituressubstantially.1
Hausman and Paquette (1987) alsodocumented substantial declines in
consumption for men who involuntarilyretired earlier than expected.
Unfortunately, these microeconomic studies of the adequacyof per-
sonal saving are now somewhat dated. Inaddition, they tend to use
fairly arbitrary standards of income orconsumption replacement to
judge the adequacy of wealth accumulation. Inthis study, we adopt a
1Other economists have reached somewhat more optimisticconclusions. See Kotlikoff,
Spivak, and Summers (1982).78Bernheim and Scholz
different strategy. Using an elaborate model of householddecision mak-
ing, we simulate asset accumulation profiles.2 We thencompare these
simulated profiles with actual profiles estimated frommore recent house-
hold survey data.
The simulation model uses a life cycle planning frameworkto establish
the criteria for household decision making. In this framework,a house-
hold's standard of living at any point is takento be a function of its
material consumption per capita, and its overall well-beingdepends
upon both its present and future standards of living. Loosely speaking,
the life cycle framework implies thata household should accumulate
wealth sufficient to finance a standard of living duringretirement that is
consistent with its standard of living prior to retirement.
The model takes as inputs certain descriptive dataconcerning a house-
hold, including age, birth cohort, current earnings,pension coverage,
education, marital status, and gender (if single). Basedon these charac-
teristics, the model imputes an earnings history,a family composition
history, and mortality probabilities. The earnings history isextrapolated
from cross-sectional age-earnings profiles and is adjustedto reflect the
economy's baseline wage growth. Similarly, the familycomposition his-
tory is constructed from estimates of the relationship betweenhouse-
hold size and various household characteristics. Mortalityprobabilities
are obtained from gender-specific actuarial tables. The model also incor-
porates important macroeconomic factors, suchas interest rates, in-
flation, economic growth rates, aspects of the federal,state, and local
income tax systems, and social security statutes.
The model generates consumption and asset trajectoriesthrough an
iterative procedure. The first step in this proceduredetermines the
household's asset accumulation plan for the firstyear of its economic life
(taken to be age 26). The choice of a plan is based inpart upon forecasts
of its future economic prospects.3 Decisions taken in theinitial year
determine the level of retirement assets that the householdcarries into
the following year. The second step of the proceduredetermines the
household's asset accumulation plan in its secondyear of economic life.
Because the household may learn more about itseconomic prospects
between the first and the second years, its forecastsmay change. Conse-
quently, the household's second-year planmay deviate from the plan
that it envisioned in the first year. For example, if duringthe second
year, rates of interest rise unexpectedly, the household may decideto
2Development of this model was sponsored by Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.For a detailed
description of the model, see Bernheim (1992b).
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FIGURE 2. Simulated After-Tax Income andConsumption Trajectories.
take advantage of this development by saving morethan it had planned
previously. Financial decisions taken in the second yearestablish the
level of retirement assets carried over into the third year.This procedure
is repeated, until the current year is reached.The household's asset
accumulation plan for the current year supplies theforecast for future
asset and consumption trajectories .'
It is important to understand that the modeldescribes the accumula-
tion of assets only for retirement. There are, of course, many reasonsto
save. Households should preparefor the possibility of illness, layoff,
disability, death, and other risks for which they areimperfectly insured.
In addition, most households accumulate resources to payfor large ex-
penses such as college tuition orthe purchase of an automobile. In the
current study, no attempt is made to estimatethe extent to which house-
holds should save for these other reasons.
Figures 2 and 3 depict the output of an illustrativesimulation run. This
It should be noted that, in each year, the model treats all forecastsof future prospects as if
these prospects were known with certainty. Yet, in each decision year,additional informa-
tion is acquired, and forecasts are revised. It would bepreferable to employ a simulation
model that would explicitly recognize uncertainty concerning futureconditions and incorpo-
rate this uncertainty into consumer decision making.However, this alternative approach
poses considerable technical problems. Thesimplified approach adopted here probably has
the effect of understanding the ideal level of asset accumulation, because,in the presence of
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FIGURE 3. Simulated Wealth Trajectory.
particular simulation was constructed for a household with the follow-
ing characteristics: age 27 (as of 1991), some college education,married,
current earnings of $60,540, and the primary earner is covered bya
private pension. Figure 2 displays, in constant 1991 dollars, this house-
hold's trajectory of after-tax earned income (includingpensions and so-
cial security) and its consumption. Note that after-taxearnings rise
steeply early in life. Earnings growth continues ata reduced level until
the individual reaches age 55, at which point it beginsto fall. After
retirement, earned income consists of social security and privatepension
benefits. Because pensions are less than perfectly indexed forinflation,
real benefits decline gradually over time.
As a direct consequence of its rapid earnings growth early in life,the
household saves nothing for retirement prior toage 30. In fact, during its
20s, the household would prefer to borrow against futureincome in
order to consume more than its current after-tax income. However,thePrivate Saving and Public Policy81
model does not permit these households to obtainloans because they
lack collateral. Between ages 30 and 80, theconsumption trajectory is
relatively flat. This property reflects thehousehold's preference for a
stable standard of living. However, during the30s and 40s, consump-
tion is somewhat elevated relative to the 60s and70s. This pattern results
from changes in household composition: betweenthe ages of 30 and 50,
the typical household incurs significant child-rearingcosts. Consump-
tion declines rapidly after age 80 until, at age101, it matches after-tax
retirement benefits. Falling survival probabilitiesdrive this end-of-life
decline. Because there is a relatively low probabilityof reaching age 90,
the household would prefer to sacrifice thestandard of living that it
would receive at age 90 (if it survived thatlong) in favor of a higher
standard of living earlier in life.
Figure 3 depicts the associated trajectory ofretirement assets. Assets
are accumulated at an increasingrate early in life. They reach a peak at
retirement and then steadily decline until they areexhausted at age 100.
Actual asset trajectories are estimated using the1983 and 1986 waves
of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). TheFederal Reserve in con-
junction with other federal agencies sponsored theSCF, and it is recog-
nized as one of the best available sources for data onhousehold balance
sheets.5
We restrict attention to married couples forwhich the husband was
fully employed and between the ages of 25 and64 in 1986. A total of
1,314 households in the SCF sample satisfy thesecriteria. Our measure
of accumulated net worth includes stocks andmutual funds, bonds,
checking and savings accounts, IRA and Keogh accounts, moneymarket
accounts, certificates of deposit, profit sharingand thrift accounts, the
dollar cash value of whole life insurance, andother financial assets, as
well as net equity in property (other than primaryresidences) and busi-
ness assets, less credit carddebt, consumer debt, and other debt.6 This
measure of net worth excludesall assets and liabilities associated with
homes and vehicles. This is appropriate becausehouseholds appear to
have a strong aversion to paying living expensesduring retirement by
reducing home equity (see Venti and Wise, 1989); moreover,it seems
likely that few individuals save for retirement byaccumulating wealth in
the form of vehicles.
We divide the sample into two subgroups,based upon whether or not
See Avery and Elliehausen (1988) and Avery andKennickell (1988) for a more complete
discussion of the SCF.
6Accumulated wealth for 1983 is expressed in 1986 dollars using theConsumer Price
Index.82Bernheim and Scholz
the husband completed college. Our sample includes 474 husbandswho
completed college and 840 husbands who did not completecollege.
Education is of interest for two reasons. First, itmay be related to differ-
ences in behavior, either because education enhances an individual's
ability to formulate coherent long-range plans,or because those who
pursue more education do so precisely because they are more likely to be
concerned about the future. Second, education is highly correlatedwith
income. Adjusted for age, the median earnings of householdsin which
the husband is college educated are roughly 57% higher thanthe median
earnings of households in which the husband is not college educated.
Because IRA eligibility is subject toan ACT cap, differences in saving
behavior across income categories is of particular interest.Although it
might seem more natural to divide the sample by incomein order to
examine these differences, that approach poses the practical difficulty
that income varies with age. For example,a household with earnings of
$50,000 at age 27 is probably much wealthierover the course of a lifetime
than a household with earnings of $55,000 atage 55. For this purpose,
one can think of education as a proxy for permanent income.
As a first step in our analysis, we examine changes in wealth between
1983 and 1986. In order to control for differences inresources across
households, we focus our discussion on the ratio of the changein wealth
to total wage income. We divide out sample into subgroups basedupon
age (25-29, 30-34, 34-39, 40-44, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, 60-64). For each
of these subgroups, we calculate the medianchange-in-wealth-to-wages
ratio (adjusting for sampling weights). Theuse of medians rather than
means is important, because the distribution of assets is highly skewed.
Although mean wealth is quite high formany population subgroups,
this fact tells us very little about the adequacy of savingfor the typical
household within these groups. Rather, it primarily reflectsthe extreme
behavior of a few unrepresentative households. Incontrast, median
wealth is not influenced by extreme outliers.
We then simulate asset accumulation trajectories for householdsthat
are representative of each population subgroup. The household charac-
teristics (wage income, years of education) chosen for these simulations
are based on within-subgroup population medians. Two simulationsare
conducted for each population subgroup:one assumes that the primary
earner is covered by a private pension, while the otherassumes that the
primary earner is not covered by a private pension.
When one is comparing estimated and simulated trajectories,it is
important to bear in mind that the simulations focuson preparation for
retirement as the sole motive for saving. Unfortunately, whenexamin-
ing the data, one cannot determine whether particularassets were accu-0.25
0.2
0.15
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mulated for retirement or for some other purpose.Aside from excluding
residences and vehicles, we make no attempt todiscern saving motives.
Consequently, the comparison between estimatedtrajectories and simu-
lated trajectories may provide an overlyoptimistic picture of the ade-
quacy of retirement saving.
Figure 4 depicts results for the "no-college"sample. "Actual" refers to
median change-in-wealth-to-wage ratiosbased upon the SCF, "Sim/no
pen" indicates simulated change-in-wealth-to-wageratios for a represen-
tative household without pension coveragefor the primary earner, and
"Simlpen" denotes simulated change-in-wealth-to-wageratios for a rep-
resentative household with pension coveragefor the primary earner.
Note that simulated change-in-wealth-to-wageratios rise steeply with
age. This occurs for two reasons.First, wages increase more rapidly than
consumption during most of an individual'sworking life (refer back to
Figure 2). Second, reinvested capital incomerises as the household accu-
mulates assets. In contrast, the actualchange-in-wealth-to-wage ratios
do not vary significantly with age. By thetime the household reaches
middle age, simulated asset accumulation exceedsactual accumulation
by a wide margin. Although actual assetaccumulation is higher than the
simulated profiles at ages 27 and 32, this result is oflittle consequence,
because the data reflect saving for a varietyof purposes aside from
retirement. Overall, Figure 4 suggests that,between 1983 and 1986,
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FIGURE 5. Rates of Asset Accumulation, College.
households without a college education saved far less thanour simula-
tion model predicts.
Figure 5 depicts results for the "college" sample. Thecontrast between
Figures 4 and 5 is remarkable. Incases where the head of household has
completed college, both simulated and actual change-in-wealth-to-wage
ratios rise steeply with age. Moreover, simulatedasset accumulation
tracks actual asset accumulation remarkably well. Takenat face value,
Figure 5 suggests that college-educated householdssaved adequately for
retirement between 1983 and 1986.
Low rates of asset accumulation do not necessarilyimply that house-
holds are inadequately prepared for retirement. Inprinciple, a house-
hold with high initial assets in 1983 (relativeto the simulated trajectory)
could save little between 1983 and 1986 and stillremain above the simu-
lated asset trajectory in 1986. Conversely, highrates of asset accumula-
tion do not necessarily imply that householdsare adequately prepared
for retirement, because these householdsmay have started out well
below the simulated trajectory. To evaluate the adequacyof retirement
preparation, one must therefore examine levels of wealth inaddition to
changes in wealth.
Consequently, as a second step inour analysis, we examine levels of
wealth for 1986. We proceed exactlyas in the first step, except that we
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ratios. Figures 6 and 7 depict theresults. These figures reinforce the les-
sons drawn from Figures4 and 5. In particular, actual asset trajectories are
far below simulated trajectories for the"no-college" sample, while actual
and simulated trajectories track eachother rather well for the "college"
sample. Indeed, because the majority of collegeeducated workers are
covered by private pensions, it appears thatactual asset trajectories are
actually above simulated trajectories for thosewith a college education.
Although it is tempting to conclude that inadequatesaving is largely
confined to those without a college education,this conclusion must be
tempered by two considerations. First, asindicated by Figure 1, personal
saving declined sharply after the 1983-1986period. Using a sample of
relatively young individuals (ages 25-44)surveyed in early 1992,
Bemheim (1992a) found much more pervasiveevidence of inadequate
saving. Second, the model probablyunderstates the amount of wealth
that each household ought to accumulate.The most obvious reason for
this bias is that the simulations envisionretirement planning as the sole
motive for saving. In addition, it is quitelikely that the model overstates
mortality probabilities (because it does notmake any allowance for the
fact that average life expectancy is projected toincrease), understates the
importance of health and long-term care costsfor the elderly, and fails to
consider the effects of mounting economicpressures that may force Con-




Bernheim (1992c) provides a more comprehensive discussionof the factors that could
produce an inefficiently low level of saving within the standard lifecycle framework.
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FIGURE 7. Total Assets, College.
Before one proceeds to the next section, it is importantto discuss a
potential criticism of this analysis. Some readersmay be inclined to
argue that our investigation sheds more light on the nature of tastes than
on the adequacy of saving for retirement (see, e.g., Lazear, 1992). After
all, any measure of adequacy is subjective. Ifa household has chosen to
save relatively little, who are we to argue? Presumably, the household
has its own best interests at heart.
We are not persuaded by this argument. Even in thecontext of the
traditional life cycle hypothesis, individualsmay face incentives that lead
to inefficiently low levels of saving. For example,as individuals save
more, they may lose the benefits from social insuranceprograms (Hub-
bard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1992), risk the loss ofeligibility for college
scholarships (Feldstein, 1992), or reduce assistance fromother members
of the extended family (Bernheim and Stark, 1988).7These considerations
may be particularly important for lower-income individuals.
It is also possible that, for some households, the life cyclehypothesis
may not adequately characterize saving behavior. Forsome economic
decisions, one can argue that, through trial anderror, an individual
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eventually learns to behave in a way that isconsistent with utility maxi-
mization. This argument, however, isless persuasive in the context of
life cycle saving. Each individualaccumulates resources for retirement
only once; there is no opportunity tolearn from one's mistakes. More-
over, the life cyclesaving decision is extraordinarily complex,in that it
requires an individual to contemplatelabor earnings, investment strate-
gies, macroeconomic trends, and a vastassortment of risks, all over a
very long time frame.It would be surprising if the averageindividual, in
isolation, with no practice and little or notraining, would act as a per-
fectly rational, farsighted utility maximizer.Manski (1993) discusses the
circumstances in which learning fromothers can take the place of per-
sonal experience. Even with goodrole models and reference groups,
however, it is difficult to imagine thathouseholds do not deviate from
their optimal life cycle consumptionprofiles.
In recent years, a number of economistshave argued against the view
that individuals act as if they maximize anintertemporal utility function,
and have instead emphasized the importanceof behavioral concepts
such as habit, mental accounting,and self-control (see, e.g., Shefrin and
Thaler, 1988). Behavioral theories allowfor the possibility that individu-
als may regret their bad habits andlack of foresight after the fact. Conse-
quently, the notion of inadequate savinghas a clear normative meaning
within the context of these theories.
The evidence offered in this section suggeststhat most households
without a college education do notbehave in a manner consistent with
optimal life cycle planning. These households savelittle relative to their
simulated asset trajectories. Moreover,their estimated and simulated
trajectories do not even exhibit the samequalitative patterns (refer once
again to Figure 4).8 Given thebehavioral differences between house-
holds with and without college degrees, animportant question arises: Is
it possible to design policies thateffectively stimulate saving at all levels
of education and income?
III. PENSION POLICY
In recent years, asset accumulationin private pension plans has ac-
counted for a substantial fraction ofpersonal saving (see Bernheim and
It could be argued that low-incomeindividuals save less relative to simulated saving
because they discount the future moreheavily. Although a higher discount factor would
reduce saving, it would not alter the qualitativefeatures of the asset trajectories (unless
discounting was high enough to prevent theaccumulation of any significant assets for
retirement).88Bernheim and Scholz
Shoven, 1988, and Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus,1991). This obser-
vation raises the possibility that policies affecting privatepensions may
have powerful effects on aggregate personalsaving. Whether or not
these effects would actually materialize in practicedepends upon the
manner in which workers would respond to an expansion of private
pension coverage. Economic theory suggests that suchan expansion
would simply crowd out other forms of personalsaving. The simulation
results presented in section II illustrate this principle.However, previ-
ous studies of personal saving generally fail to find evidence forthe
hypothesis that private pensions reduce other forms ofpersonal saving
(see, e.g., the review in Shefrin and Thaler, 1988,especially pp. 622-
624). Depending upon whetherone credits the theoretical analysis or
the empirical studies, one can reach dramaticallydifferent conclusions
about the effect of pension policy on aggregatepersonal saving.
The analysis of section II raisesan intriguing possibility: if the behav-
ior of those with college education conforms to the predictionsof the life
cycle hypothesis, while the behavior of thosewithout a college educa-
tion does not, then perhaps private pensions do displacepersonal sav-
ing among the college educated, but do not displacepersonal saving
among the rest of the population. In this case, pension policy couldbe
an effective tool for stimulating total personal saving,as long as it is
primarily used to provide incentives forexpansion of coverage among
lower-income (less-educated) workers.
To investigate the effect of pensionson household saving, we estimate
equations that explain the median value of thewealth-to-wage ratio
(henceforth, WWRAT) as a function of the husband'sage (AGE), total
household earnings (EARN), anda dummy variable summarizing the
husband's private pension coverage (PENS).9 Weemploy a cubic func-
tion of AGE to allow for flexible age-wealth trajectories.Because earn-
ings may be related to the shape of the asset trajectoryas well as to its
absolute level, we also interact EARN with AGE.For similar reasons,
PENS is interacted with AGE in most specifications.
For purposes of comparison with the previous literature,it is useful to
begin with results for the entire data sample (allhouseholds, irrespective
of educational attainment). The following estimatedequation is consis-
tent with the view that pensions fail to displace other formsof personal
saving:
Because our object is to explain median wealth rather thanmean wealth, we employ
quantile regression techniques (least absolute deviations), ratherthan more traditional
regression techniques (least-squared deviations).Private Saving and Public Policy89
WWRAT = 4.72 + 0.411 AGE - 0.115(AGE)2/10 + 0.106 (AGE)3/103
(1.34)(0.098) (0.023) (0.017)
- 0.140EARNI1O4 + 0.581 EARN x AGEI1O6 0.0004 PENS.
(0.024) (0.045) (0.0379)
Note that the coefficient of the pensiondummy is economically trivial
and statistically insignificant.
The absence of a relationship betweenpension coverage and personal
saving is sometimes interpreted asproviding evidence that standard
economic models do not faithfully representthe typical household's
decision-making process. Proponents ofthe standard model, however,
argue that the absenceof a pension effect is a statistical artifact. Pension
coverage is not random. Aworker who is concerned about retirement may
turn down job offers from employerswho fail to provide attractive pen-
sion benefits. Conversely, a workerwho gives little thought to retire-
ment may be unwilling to accept ajob that provides pension coverage if
this offer entails a reduction in currentdisposable income. If these hypo-
thetical facts are indeed descriptive ofbehavior, then those who are
inclined to select jobs with pension coveragewill tend to save more than
those who are inclined to select jobswithout pension coverage. For any
particular individual, a private pension maydisplace other forms of
saving; however, in the data, this pattern maybe obscured by the fact
that pension coverage is correlatedwith the inclination to save more. In
other words, a sample selection effect mayoffset the saving-displacement
effect.
Unless we can determine whether theabsence of a pension effect is a
behavioral phenomenon or a statistical artifact, wecannot predict the
impact of a change in pension policy onpersonal saving. We suggest a
method of distinguishing between these twohypotheses, based upon
the following argument. It is certainlypossible that, by coincidence, a
sample selection effect exactly offsets thesaving-displacement effect.
However, the magnitude of thesaving-displacement effect should vary
systematically with age; specifically, the differencebetween the accumu-
lated assets of those with pension coverageand those without pension
coverage should increasewith age. Although the sample selectioneffect
may also vary with age,it seems highly unlikely that these two effects
would exactly offset each other at every age.
We therefore estimate a new equation,in which an interaction term
involving PENS and AGE is added tothe list of explanatory variables.
The estimated relationship is as follows:90Bernheim and Scholz
WWRAT = 4.64 + 0.406 AGE- 0.114 (AGE)2/10 + 0.105 (AGE)3/103
(1.47)(0.108) (0.025) (0.019)
- 0.137 EARN/b4 + 0.576 EARN x AGE/lU6 - 0.098 PENS
(0.026) (0.049) (0.169)
+ 0.310 PENS x AGE/b2.
(0.373)
Taken individually, the coefficients of the pension variableslack statisti-
cal significance. In addition, the hypothesis that bothcoefficients equal
zero is entirely consistent with the data.10 In other words, privatepen-
sion eligibility is not systematically relatedto either the level or the
shape of the asset accumulation trajectory. Although,in principle, this
could stifi reflect the offsetting effects of asset displacementand sample
selection, it seems implausible that these effects would offseteach other
at every age. It appears more likely that there is littleor no behavioral
link between pension eligibility and personal saving.
Of course, the preceding results do not distinguishbetween house-
holds on the basis of education. In light ofour previous findings, it is
clearly important to make this distinction. We thereforeestimate wealth
trajectories separately for the two subgroups (college educated,not col-
leged educated) described in section II.
We obtain the following equation for householdswithout a college
education:
WWRAT = 3.60 + 0.313 AGE- 0.086 (AGE)2/10 + 0.077 (AGE)3/b03
(1.51)(0.111) (0.026) (0.020)
- 0.110 EARN/b4 + 0.406 EARN x AGE/b6 + 0.008 PENS
(0.044) (0.088) (0.176)
- 0.125 PENS x AGE/b2.
(0.395)
Note that the coefficients of the pension variablesare even smaller, both
in terms of economic and statistical significance, than theywere in the pre-
vious equation (based on the full sample). In orderto illustrate the impli-
cations of this equation, we extrapolate asset trajectories forhypothetical
10The F statistic for the joint hypothesis that both coefficientsequal zero is 0.78. One
would obtain an F statistic of this magnitudeor greater roughly 46% of the time, even if the
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FIGURE 8. Estimated Wealth Trajectories, NoCollege.
households with pension coverage and households withoutpension cov-
erage.11 Figure 8 exhibits these trajectories.Note that pension eligibility
bears little or no relationship to the path ofthe wealth-to-wage ratio.
In contrast, we estimate the following equationfor households with a
college education:
WWRAT = 5.78 - 0.502 AGE + 0.126(AGE)2/10 - 0.080 (AGE)3/103
(4.58)(0.329) (0.077) (0.058)
+ 0.062 EARN/104 - 0.021 EARN xAGE/b6 + 0.899 PENS - 2.83 PENS
(0.048) (0.091) (0.563) (1.25)
x AGE/b2.
Note that the coefficients of the pensionvariables in this equation are
much more significant, both economically andstatistically. The data deci-
sively reject the hypothesis that both of thesecoefficients equal zero.12
11 For the purpose of this calculation, the household's earnings aretaken to be constant at
$30,000. This figure is close to median age-adjusted earningsfor households without a
college education.
12 The F statistic for this hypothesis is 5.60, which is significant at the 99% level ofconfidence.
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Note also that the signs of all the other coefficientsin the equation for
college-educated households are exactly thereverse of the signs of these
coefficients in the equation for households withoutcollege education.
Clearly, the behavior of these twogroups differs markedly.
In order to illustrate the implications of theestimated equation for
college-educated households, we extrapolate assetaccumulation trajec-
tories for hypothetical households with privatepensions and without
private pensions.13 Figure 9 depicts these trajectories.Note that those
individuals who are eligible for pensions accumulateresources at a signifi-
cantly slower rate than those individuals withoutpensions. Remarkably,
at age 62, the gap between the assets of these twogroups is almost identi-
cal in magnitude to the gap thatemerges from our simulations (Figure 7).
These patterns are strongly consistent with the view thatprivate pensions
displace other personal saving for college-educatedhouseholds. It is un-
likely that the observed relationship betweenpension coverage and sav-
ing results from spurious factors, because such factorswould presumably
also have produced the same patterns for less-educatedhouseholds.14
These results suggest that previous studiesmay have failed to find a
significant saving displacement effect simply because theydid not distin-
guish between households on the basis of education.
The contrast between Figures 8 and 9 pointsto a clear and important
conclusion: private pensions displace personal wealthaccumulation only
when the head of the household is college educated.This is consistent
with the findings of section lIon the adequacy ofpersonal saving. Indeed,
our evidence tends to support a more general conclusion: college-
educated households behave in themanner predicted by standard eco-
nomic theories of saving, while households with lesseducation do not.
It should be emphasized that past andcurrent policies have been more
successful at stimulating the expansion ofpension coverage among
college-educated workers than among those with lesseducation. Analy-
sis of the SCF data reveals that 75.2% of husbands withcollege degrees are
covered by private pensions, in comparisonto 55.7% of husbands without
college degrees. In other words, thecurrent system is quite effective at
providing pensions to those who reduce othersaving in response, but is
substantially less effective at providingcoverage to those individuals for
whom pensions would represent incrementalsaving.
13 For the purpose of this calculation, the household'searnings are taken to be constant at
$50,000. This figure is close to age-adjusted median earnings forhouseholds with a college
education.
14 It is worth mentioning that there issome evidence of a small sample selection effect: the
trajectory for households with pensions starts out slightly above thetrajectory for house-
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Proposals to encourage or require portability of private pensions could
have the effect of expanding pension coverage among lower-income
workers. The absence of portability substantially reducesthe benefits of
pension coverage for workers with relatively little jobstability. On aver-
age, these workers also haverelatively low earnings. Portability would
enhance the attractiveness of pensions to workers withlittle job stability
and thereby increase the likelihood that these workers would obtain
pension coverage.
A more drastic proposal would require employers toprovide all work-
ers with private pension coverage.Although this requirement would not
be related to income, it would have a far greater impact onpension
coverage among low-income workers than onpension coverage among
high-income workers (roughly three-fourths of whom are already cov-
ered). In response to this requirement, those employers who had not
previously provided pension coverage would probably reduce other
forms of employee compensation. Our analysis suggests that newly cov-
ered workers with high earnings would simply adjust other personal
saving to offset this change. In contrast, newly covered workers with
lower earnings would reduce consumption. In effect, mandatory pen-
sion coverage would force lower-income households to increasesaving.
Our analysis also raises concern about the recent growth of 401K
plans. Participation in these plans is entirely voluntary. Many employers
57
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have substituted 401K plans for more conventional plans in an effort to
reduce operating expenses. We would not expect this trend to havea
significant impact on the total amount of saving done either byor on
behalf of high-income workers. However, the elimination of compulsory
contributions may significantly depress total saving by or on behalf of
lower-income workers.
IV. TAX INCENTIVES FOR SAVING
The most commonly discussed strategies for stimulating personal saving
entail reductions in capital income taxation. Economic theory suggests
that households will respond to a higher after-tax rate of return by in-
creasing future consumption relative to current consumption. However,
the increase in anticipated future net worth resulting from higherrates
of return may actually induce households to save less. Indeed, empirical
estimates of the interest elasticity of saving (which measures the sensitiv-
ity of saving to the after-tax rate of return) vary widely (see,e.g., Boskin,
1978; Summers, 1981; and Hall, 1988).
Current policies provide saving incentives primarily to lower-income
households. Eligibility for deductible IRAs, for example, is subject toan
AGI cap. The existence of an AGI cap raises an important question:
does the interest elasticity of saving vary systematicallyacross income
classes?
Simulations based upon the model described in section II suggest that
higher-income households should be much more responsive than lower-
income households to a change in the after-tax rate of return. According
to these simulations, a 35-year-old, high-school-educated couple with
pension coverage and annual earnings of $30,000 in 1991 should have
saved roughly 1.5% of its earnings.15 A permanent, one percentage point
rise in the before-tax rate of return modestly increases this figureto
1.6%. In contrast, a 35-year-old, college-educated couple with pension
coverage and annual earnings of $50,000 in 1991 should have saved
roughly 4.8% of its earnings. The same permanent, one percentage point
rise in the before-tax rate of return increases this figure bya much larger
amount (both absolutely and proportionately), to 5.5%. Similar results
hold for couples without pensions. For the representative high-school-
educated couple, saving would fall from 5.6% of earnings to 4.5% of
earnings in response to the higher rate of return; for the college-
15In this calculation, the rate of saving is defined as saving above and beyond reinvest-
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educated couple, it would fall less (both absolutely andproportionately),
from 9.2% to 8.8%.16
The contrast between the simulated responses ofcollege-educated in-
dividuals and high-school-educated individuals becomes even more
striking when one factors in the statistics on pension coverage men-
tioned at the end of section III. If one averages across thoseindividuals
with pensions and those individuals withoutpensions, the simulations
imply that saving by college-educated householdswould increase by
10.2% in response to a permanent one percentagepoint increase in the
before-tax rate of return, while the saving of householdswithout college
degrees would fall by 4.5%. Consequently, apolicy that provides tax
incentives for saving exclusively to lower-incomehouseholds excludes
those households that are most likely to increasesaving in response to
the policy; indeed, it is conceivable that suchpolicies could actually
reduce aggregate personal saving.
It is important to emphasize that this positiverelationship between
income and the interest elasticity of savingresults from a natural eco-
nomic consideration, rather than from somepeculiar feature of the simu-
lation model. It is natural to assume that, whenplanning for the future,
most households are concerned first andforemost with assuring them-
selves of some minimum standard of living.As lifetime resources in-
crease, households have more discretionto allocate resources over time
in a way that increases consumption aboveand beyond this minimum
standard. Saving to provide for minimum consumption is,in effect,
saving for a fixed target. It is well known that anindividual who saves to
achieve some target will reduce saving in response to anincrease in the
rate of return (see, e.g., Bernheim andShoven, 1988). In contrast, discre-
tionary saving to finance consumption overand above the target re-
sponds positively to an increase in the rate of return. Forlow-income
households, saving to achieve the minimum consumptiontarget is
probably far more important than saving to fundincremental consump-
tion. Thus, target saving dominates thesimulated behavior of these
households, and produces a low or negative interest elasticityof saving.
On the other hand, for high-income households,saving to fund incre-
16These simulations imply that the interest elasticity of savingtends to be higher when the
household has private pension coverage. The explanation for thisphenomenon is straight-
forward. An increase in the rate of return reduces the presentdiscounted value of future
income; in that sense, it makes the household poorer, andreduces current consumption.
(This effect was originally noted by Summers, 1981). Becausepension income is received
after retirement, its present discounted value is more sensitive tothe rate of return than is
the present discounted value of future (preretirement)earnings. Thus, those individuals
with pensions are more likely than those individuals without pensions toreduce current
consumption in response to an increase in the rate of return.96Bernheim and Scholz
mental consumption is probably far more important than savingto
achieve the minimum consumption target. Consequently, incremental
saving dominates the simulated behavior of these households andpro-
duces a high-interest elasticity of saving. In the appendix,we develop
this argument mathematically and demonstrate fora simple model that
the interest elasticity of saving rises with income.
Throughout this section, we have assumed that household behavior
accords with standard economic theories. The preceding sections call
this premise into question. However, this observation doesnot under-
mine our conclusion. We have found that the behavior of college-
educated (high-income) households does correspond to the predictions
of standard theories; consequently, for this group, it is likely thatone
would observe a substantial interest elasticity of saving. On the other
hand, we have also found that the behavior of households withouta
college education (those with lower income) does not conformto stan-
dard economic theories. Although this finding reducesour faith in the
applicability of our simulation results, it does notreverse our conclu-
sions concerning the interest elasticity of saving. The notion that house-
holds will respond to a change in the after-tax rate of return is predicated
upon the assumption that households rationally anticipate and plan for
future economic contingencies. To the extend that this assumption
proves incorrect, there is no particular reason to believe that low-income
households will respond to a change in the after-tax rate of return.
Most current proposals to provide tax incentives for savingare pat-
terned after IRAs. IRAs were established as part of the 1974 Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, to give workers whowere not covered
by employer-provided pension plans added incentivesto accumulate
resources for retirement. In 1981, IRA eligibility was extended to all
taxpayers. Subsequently, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 curtailed the tax
deductibility of IRA contributions for high-income households.
Two prominent current policy initiatives wouldreverse the direction
of the 1986 reforms and extend tax incentives for saving to householdsin
higher-income brackets. The Bush Administration's Family Saving Ac-
counts (FSAs) would allow single individuals with incomes below
$60,000 and married couples with incomes below $120,000 to makecon-
tributions of up to $2,500 per person (not including children)to qualified
accounts. The FSA proposal is an example of a "back-loaded" system:
contributions are nondeductible, but accumulated fundsare not taxed
upon withdrawal. An alternative proposal, the Bentsen-Roth "super-
IRA," would allow contributions of up to $2,000per person (not includ-
ing children) to either a traditional or a back-loaded IRA.
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tiveness of extending eligibility for IRA-style accountsto higher-income
households. First, contributions are capped. Underthe current system,
a single taxpayer, forexample, can make no more than $2,000 in tax-
deductible contributions. For any taxpayer whowould have saved more
than $2,000 in the absence of IRAs, the availabilityof an IRA does not
affect the costs or the benefits that result from anadditional dollar of
saving and, therefore, provides no incentive onthe margin for the tax-
payer to increase saving. Insuch cases the IRA constitutes a "giveaway"
of public funds, and its principal effect is to reducefederal tax receipts.
In addition, the IRA may actually induce the taxpayer tospend more on
current consumption, because it increases his orher total after-tax re-
sources. For both of these reasons,the IRA would contribute to a lower
rate of national saving. These concerns areof little significance for low-
income households, because few of themwould save more than $2,000
in the absence of the program. It is far morelikely that high-income
households would save more than the contributionlimit Thus, a stan-
dard IRA-style scheme may be a particularlyineffective method of pro-
viding high-income households with tax incentivesfor saving.
Second, even if a taxpayer would not (in the absenceof IRAs) have
saved more than the IRA contribution limit in a given year,he or she
could take full advantage of the IRA deduction eitherby drawing down
previously accumulated assets or by borrowing.Indeed, the 1992 Tax
Guide for College Teachers and Other College Personneldevotes a full page to
the issue, "What if You're Short of Cash to FundYour IRA?" (pp. 229-
230). The guide describes an IRS private letterruling that allows house-
holds to finance their IRAs by borrowing.Contributions funded either
by shifting existing assets or by borrowing do notincrease household
saving. Instead, they depress national saving byreducing federal tax
receipts, and add to the federal budget deficit. Onceagain, high-income
households, who possess greater wealth, financialsophistication, and
access to credit markets, are morelikely than lower-income households
to engage in borrowing or asset shiftingand thereby defeat the purpose
of the program.
Empirical evidence on the efficacy of IRAs is mixed.Gale and Scholz
(1992) find little evidence that IRAs stimulatedhousehold saving be-
tween 1983 and 1986. Venti and Wise(1986, 1987, 1990, 1991) and
Feenberg and Skinner (1989) argue that most IRAcontributions during
this period represent net increases inhousehold saving. Joines and
Manegold (1991) conclude that the effects of IRAs onhousehold saving
are unlikely to be as large asthe estimates of Venti and Wise and may be
as small as the estimatesof Gale and Scholz.
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"Premium Saving Accounts" (PSA5), is described in Bernheim and
Scholz (1992). A PSA system would require each taxpayer tosave in total
some fixed amount (the "floor") before becoming eligible to make contri-
butions to a tax-favored account. For each dollar saved inexcess of the
floor, the taxpayer would be eligible to contribute one additional dollar
to the tax-favored account, up to some limit ("the ceiling"). These floors
and ceilings would vary with AGI and certain types of capital income.
As with IRAs, capital income accrued on balances held in PSAaccounts
would be exempt from taxation.17
The use of both floors and ceilings would create "windows" ofpro-
gram eligibility. Consider, for example, a husband and wife with a com-
bined AGI of $80,000. They might face a floor of $8,000 anda ceiling of
$12,000. Should they save less than $8,000 in the correspondingtax year,
they would not be eligible to make any contributions toa tax-favored
account. If, on the other hand, they saved $9,500, they would be eligible
for favorable tax treatment on $1,500. If they savedmore than $12,000,
then they would be eligible to make the maximum contribution of$4,000
(the difference between $12,000 and $8,000).
The most important and distinctive feature of a PSA system is that
floors and ceilings would vary with AGI. Eligibility windowscould be
positioned to maximize, within each income class, the number of house-
holds receiving tax breaks on the marginal dollar of saving. Thus,
higher-income taxpayers would not be deprived of tax incentivesfor
saving; rather, they would simply be required to save large fractions of
their incomes than lower-income taxpayers before becoming eligible for
the program. It would also be much more difficult for householdsto take
advantage of tax-favored PSA accounts by shifting assetsor by borrow-
ing, because eligibility would be based upon total saving. An individual
cannot increase total saving by shifting assets from one account toan-
other or by borrowing in order to invest.18
To implement a PSA system, one needs tomeasure saving. Bernheim
and Scholz (1992) propose the following measure:19
'' With this essential structure,a PSA system could be either front-loaded or back-loaded.
Penalties could be established to lock funds into tax-favored accounts for relatively short
periods of time (e.g., seven years), or until some age close to retirement (perhapsage59k).
Accounts could be established for specific purposes (e.g., retirement, purchase ofa home,
college education), or the accounts could be unrestricted.
18 The administrative feasibility of monitoring total savingfor each taxpayer is discussed in
Bernheim and Scholz (1992).
19 Many economists would define savingas the change in the stock of wealth between two
points in time. If one adopts this definition, then saving isvery hard to measureone
would need to assess the market value of all assets everyyear. The definition used in the
text represents a compromise between economic logic and administrative feasibility.Private Saving and Public Policy99
Net purchases of assets (i.e., for assets onwhich investors receive
capital gains and losses, total purchases minustotal sales),
plus
The January 1 to January 1 change incash account balances (e.g.,
bank accounts),
minus
The January 1 to January 1 change intotal debt (e.g., mortgages and
consumer credit).
In effect, saving is defined as theincremental personal resources that an
individual diverts into investments in any given year, overand above
reinvested capital gains.20
If this definition of saving is employed,then it is also important to
adjust each taxpayer's eligibility floorsand ceilings upward by the
amount of capital income other than capitalgains. In the absence of such
an adjustment, the systemwould distort investors' choices among as-
sets, causing them to tilt theirportfolios toward assets that produce
current income, rather than capital gains.See Bernheim and Scholz
(1992) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
In the remainder of this section, weevaluate the effects of three dis-
tinct strategies for stimulating householdsaving: an IRA-like program
with an ACT cap (henceforth referred to asthe "standard IRA" system),
an IRA-like programwithout an ACT cap (henceforth referred to as the
"universal IRA" system), and a PSA system. We comparethe cost-
effectiveness of extending tax incentivesfor saving to higher-income
taxpayers through universal IRAsand PSAs.
Table 1 contains illustrative eligibility schedulesfor a PSA system. We
selected these particular schedules after examiningthe empirical distribu-
tion of saving. We restricted attention to aclass of simple schedules and
chose the schedules that provide maximumsaving incentives.21
The schedules define eligibility windowsfor each level of ACI. In
order to facilitate comparison with IRAs, wehave adopted window
widths of $2,000 per year for single households,$2,250 per year for
married couples with one earner, and $4,000 per yearfor married cou-
ples with two earners. The lower end of thewindow (the floor) is deter-
mined by a two-part calculation. First, compute thevalue of an algebraic
° Note that it is possible to compute this measure of saving withoutassessing the value of
unrealized capital assets because, by definition, unrealized gains arefully reinvested.
21An eligibility schedule belongs to this class if the flooris set equal to zero up to some
level of AGI, beyond which the floor rises linearlywith AGI. We also studied more
complex schedules but discovered that it was difficult to improvesignificantly upon the





(added to capital income)
Deductible qualified
contribution ceiling
(added to floor)* If your income is
Married couples
Less than $34,000 0 $2,250 or $4,000
Greater than $34,000 .167 x (Income - 34,000) $2,250 or $4,000
Single households
Less than $42,000 0 $2,000
Greater than $42,000 .34 X (Income - 42,000) $2,000
For the purpose of comparison with IRAs, married couples withone earner are allowed to contribute
$2,250, and married couples with two earners can contribute $4,000.In the actual implementation of
this proposal, we see no compelling reason to make this distinction.
expression involving ACT. We refer to this valueas the "unadjusted
floor"it is identical for all taxpayers with thesame level of ACT. Sec-
ond, add capital income other than capital gainsto obtain the "adjusted
floor" (or simply, "the floor"). Table 1 indicates, forexample, that a dual-
earner married couple with an ACT of $30,000 andno capital income
would have a floor of $0 anda ceiling of $4,000. In contrast, a couple
with an ACT of $120,000 and dividend andinterest income of $2,000
would have a floor of $16,362 (0.167 x $86,000+ $2,000) and a ceiling of
$20,362. Figure 10 graphs the proposed eligibility schedulefor married
couples. Note that because the typical U.S. householdsaves very little,
the floor is zero for lower-income households.
The standard and universal IRA systems differ fromthe PSA proposal
in that the IRA systems anchor the eligibilitywindow at $0 for all income
classes, and no adjustment is made for capitalincome. The standard
system phases out deductible contributions for couples withincomes
between $40,000 and $50,000 and for singletaxpayers with incomes be-
tween $25,000 and $35,000. The universal system allows allhouseholds
to make deductible contributions.22
We will compare these planson the basis of three criteria. The first
criterion is a measure of effectiveness. Specifically, foreach plan, we
estimate the number of households that wouldreceive a higher after-tax
rate of return on the incremental dollar of investment.We refer to these
households as the TMPACT GROUP. Our secondcriteria is a measure of
wasteful subsidization. Specifically, for each plan,we estimate the num-
The IRA-like proposals we simulate are superior to actual IRAschemes, because, in
practice, IRA schemes are susceptible to tax arbitrage strategies involvingborrowing and
asset shifting, which our simulations do not capture.Private Saving and Public Policy101
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FIGURE 10. PSA Eligibility Schedule, Married Couples (no capital
income).
ber of households that would make the maximum eligible contribution
to a tax-favored account while continuing to receive the unsubsidized
after-tax rate of return on the incremental dollar of investment. We refer
to these households as the NO-IMPACT GROUP. Our third criterion is
also a measure of wasteful subsidization: we calculate the budgetary cost
of subsidizing the NO-IMPACT GROUP. We refer to this cost as the
GIVEAWAY.
In evaluating these plans, it may be useful to consider other criteria,
such as the ratio of the number of households in the IMPACT GROUP
to the DOLLARS OF GIVEAWAY. A "bang-for-the-buck" ratio of this
type would provide some indication of the cost-effectiveness of each
proposal.
To calculate the size of the IMPACT GROUP, NO-IMPACT GROUP,
and DOLLARS OF GIVEAWAY, we must predict the extent to which
each household would participate in each plan. Our predictions are
predicated on three behavioral assumptions. First, we assume that no
household would make a contribution to any tax-favored account unless
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it would contribute to a universal IRA. Second, if a household would
make a contribution to a universal IRA, then that same household would
also, if eligible, contribute to either a standard IRA or a PSA. The justifi-
cation for these first two assumptions is compelling: both proposals are
identical to the universal IRA system, except that eligibility is more
restricted.
Our third assumption concerns the magnitude of contributions. For
each alternative proposal, we assume that an eligible household would
make the maximum allowable contribution when two conditions are
satisfied: the household would contribute to a universal IRA, and its
total saving would exceed its eligibility ceiling. This third assumption is
more problematic than the others. Saving in a tax-favored account may
be an imperfect substitute for other forms of saving because, perhaps, of
restrictions on early withdrawal. Thus, it is conceivable that some house-
holds would contribute less than the maximum amount even when
these conditions are satisfied. In practice, it would be very difficult to
identify these households with available data.
Obviously, our three assumptions are helpful only if we know whether
or not households are inclined to make contributions to universal IRA
accounts. During the period of universal IRA eligibility, this inclination
can be inferred from actual behavior. Consequently, we base our calcula-
tions upon a sample of households surveyed in 1983 and 1986 for which
data on IRA participation are available.
More specifically, we use the 1983 and 1986 waves of the SCF. Key
variables are constructed as follows. Income is defined as the average of
total household income for 1983, 1984, and 1985. Our measure of saving
corresponds to the definition proposed earlier. To calculate the net
change in assets exclusive of capital gains or losses, we calculate (by
asset category) the average constant contribution needed to generate the
balance in 1986, given the observed balance in 1983 and the average rate
of return that prevailed during this period. Our asset categories include
stocks and mutual funds, bonds, IRA and Keogh accounts, money mar-
ket accounts, certificates of deposit, profit sharing and thrift accounts,
the dollar cash value of whole life insurance, and other financial assets
(for a more detailed discussion of the calculations, see Gale and Scholz,
1992). Changes in cash account balances (saving and checking accounts)
and total debt are measured directly.
Table 2 provides background information on the saving propensities
of households that contributed to IRA accounts. The top panel shows
that, on average across income groups, total saving was positive for only
59.5 percent of participating couples. Among those households that












Data are from the 1983-1986 Survey of ConsumerFinances. Saving is defined in the text, income
deciles are given in Table 1.
The weighted number of couples that contributed toIRA5 between 1983 and 1986 is 13,536,814.
The weighted number of singles that contributed toIRA5 between 1983 and 1986 is 3,252,938.
to $90,296 in the highest incomequintile. These averages, however, are
affected by the relatively small numberof households that saved very
large amounts. The third column of thetable provides the saving of the
typical (median) participating householdswith positive total saving in
each income quintile. These figures rangefrom $3,840 in the bottom
quintile to $19,695 in the top quintile.The typical participating couple
with positive saving accumulates$7,128 per year. The corresponding
figure for single households is$3,579.23
Table 3 compares the effect of thepolicies on married couples. The top
panel shows the size of the IMPACTGROUP. Overall, the PSA system
provides incentives to 2.4 millioncouples, roughly 90 percent more than
the IRA with AGI restrictions and 30percent more than the universal
IRA. The difference is particularlypronounced in the top income quin-
tile. By definition, the IRA withAGI caps ignores these households.
Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabelhaus (1991) and Ventiand Wise (1992) present tabulations
on household saving fromseveral microdatasets, including the Survey of ConsumerFi-
nances. The numbers on savingpresented in Tale 2 differ from these other tabulationsin
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Income quintile
Simulations use data from the 1983-1986 Survey of ConsumerFinances. Saving and column headings
are defined in the text. The PSA schedule is given in Table 1.
Relative to the universal IRA, the PSAincreases the number of couples
receiving marginal incentives in the top incomequintile by 122.4 per-
cent.24 Because, in this sample,over 60 percent of positive household
saving is attributable to households inthe top quintile of the income
distribution, this improvement is particularlyimportant.
The bottom two panels of Table 3measure the NO-IMPACT group
and the cost of these ineffective subsidies.The calculations show, for
24 Because high-income householdsare more likely to increase saving in response to tax
incentives, there is some justification for selectingan eligibility schedule that would maxi-
mize the IMPACT GROUP in the top incomequintile, rather than the total IMPACT
GROUP. This would be accomplished witha schedule that sets the floor equal to zero as
long as AGI is below $45,000, and increases thefloor by 17.7 cents for each dollar of AGI
over $45,000. Relative to the universal IRA, this PSA scheduleincreases the number of
couples receiving marginal incentives in the top incomequintile by 266.1 percent. Surpris-
ingly, the use of a schedule that maximizes theIMPACT GROUP for the top quintile, rather
than the total IMPACT GROUP, reduces thetotal IMPACT GROUP only slightly (by
roughly 9,000 households). However, it increasesthe NO-IMPACT GROUP by 9.7 percent.
Impact group (in l000s)
Lowest 559 559 560 Second 344 344 377 Middle 353 550 602 Fourth o 284 622 Highest o 102 228 Full population 1,256
No-impact group (in 1000s)
1,840 2,388
Lowest 1,039 1,039 921 Second 1,262 1,262 1,143 Middle 1,277 1,080 813 Fourth 0 1,420 773 Highest o 1,416 817 Full population 3,578
Annual giveaway (in $1,000,000s)
6,218 4,467
Lowest 465 465 401 Second 813 813 725 Middle 728 1,002 767 Fourth o 1,631 858 Highest o 1,950 1,119 Full population 2,006 5,861 3,870
TABLE 3*
A Comparison of Three Saving-IncentiveProposals, Married Couples.
IRA Universal
wI AGI cap IRA PSAPrivate Saving and Public Policy105
TABLE 4*
A Comparison of Three Saving-IncentiveProposals, Single Taxpayers.
Simulations use data from the 1983-1986 Survey ofConsumer Finances. Saving and column headings
are defined in the text. The PSA schedule isgiven in Table 1.
example, that the PSA system wouldreduce the number of households
in the NO-IMPACT group by1.75 million (28.2 percent) andwould
reduce federal expenditures on ineffectivesubsidies by $2.0 billion (34.0
percent), relative to the universal IRA. Interms of cost-effectiveness, the
PSA system increases the ratio of theIMPACT GROUP to the GIVE-
AWAY by 96.5 percent overall, and by287.2 percent (i.e., by a factor of
almost four) in the top income quintile.The IRA with AGI caps also
effectively reduces ineffective subsidiesand budgetary cost, but it
achieves this reduction by excluding the veryhouseholds that are most
likely to respond to tax incentives.
Table 2 reveals that participatingsingle households saved consider-
ably less than married households.Nevertheless, the gains from adopt-
ing the PSA system would still besubstantial for single households.
Table 4 indicates that the size of theIMPACT group would increase by
15.1 percent overall, and by 235.4 percentin the top-income quintile,






Impact group (in 1000s)
Lowest 188 188 199
Second 105 105 150
Middle 136 173 173
Fourth 25 97 38
Highest 0 40 134
Full population 454 603 694
No-impact group (in l000s)
Lowest 196 196 185
Second 280 280 236
Middle 312 275 275
Fourth 290 304 263
Highest 0 350 197
Full population 1,078 1,405 1,155
Annual giveaway (in $1,000,000s)
Lowest 66 66 62
Second 141 141 117
Middle 168 158 158
Fourth 85 188 163
Highest 0 292 151
Full population 460 845 650106Bernheim and Scholz
NO-IMPACT group and the GIVEAWAY would fallrelative to the uni-
versal IRA proposal. The result isa 49.7 percent increase in overall cost-
effectiveness (the ratio of the IMPACTgroup to GIVEAWAY), and a
551.3 percent increase in cost-effectiveness for thetop quintile, relative
to the universal IRA proposal.
These comparisons of IRA and PSA proposalsincompletely incorporate
behavioral responses. For example, householdssaving strictly less than
the PSA eligibility floor might increase theirsaving in order to become
eligible for PSAs. It is also possible that theseproposals will differentially
affect saving for psychologicalreasons. Indeed, those who believe that
IRAs significantly stimulated private saving oftensuggest psychological
explanations, such as the following: (1) IRAswere aggressively marketed
by financial institutions; (2) IRAs providedtaxpayers with an effective
way of earmarking funds for retirement, thereby facilitating thedivision
of funds into distinct "mental accounts,"some of which are psychologi-
cally more difficult to invade; (3) the existence ofa sizable early with-
drawal penalty effectively locked savinginto IRAs, thereby helping
households to impose self-discipline; and (4)the IRA eligibility limitpro-
vided households with a saving "target." Empiricalevidence suggests
that the fourth effect was particularly important(many households con-
tributed exactly $2,000, the widely publicizedcontribution limit, even in
cases where they were actually eligible to contributemore). The PSA
system, like a universal IRA program, wouldpreserve all these features.
Indeed, the fourth effect would probably bestrengthened with PSAs,
because the proposal would providemany taxpayers with more ambi-
tious targets.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The evidence presented in thispaper supports the view that many Ameri-
cans, particularly those without a college education,save too little. Our
analysis also indicates that it should be possibleto increase total personal
saving among lower-income households byencouraging the formation
and expansion of private pension plans. It isdoubtful that favorable tax
treatment of capital income would stimulate significantadditional saving
by this group. Conversely, the expansionof private pensions would
probably have little effect on saving by higher-incomehouseholds. How-
ever, these households are more likely to increase saving significantlyin
response to favorable tax treatment of capital income. Currently,eligi-
bility for IRAs is linked toan ACT cap, and pension coverage is more
common among higher-income households thanamong low-incomehouseholds. The most effective systemfor promoting personal saving
would have precisely the opposite features.
Extending tax incentives for saving tohigher-income households is
problematic. We have discussed threecompeting policy options: IRAs
with AGI caps, the universal IRA,and the PSA. Our analysis reveals
that the PSA system is a morecost-effective vehicle for providing saving
incentives to all households, particularlythose in the top quintile of the
income distribution.
Pension policies and tax policies do notexhaust the full range of
strategies for stimulating personal saving.One particular class of policies
not discussed here merits furtherattention. An accumulating bodyof
evidence, including that contained insections II and III of this paper,
suggests that the behavior of manyhouseholds (particularly those with
lower income) are not well describedby traditional economic theories.
Consequently, it may be possible to design moreeffective policies by
educating the population or by exploitingthe psychology of saving. The
Japanese appear to have hadconsiderable success with such a strategy
during the postwar period (see Horioka,1988, and Bernheim, 1991). The
development of a framework foranalyzing policies of this type is an
important research priority.
APPENDIX: HOUSEHOLDINCOME AND THE
INTEREST ELASTICITY OF SAVING
Consider a two-period model, in which anindividual maximizes





where c denotes consumption in thetth period of life (t = 1.2), r is the
after-tax rate of return, w is earnings inthe first period, w is earnings in
the second period (the readershould construe this as pension income,
where< 1 is the replacement rate), m isminimum consumption, and a
is the (constant) elasticity ofmarginal utility with respect to consump-
tion. Optimization requires
c2 - m ='y(c1 - m)
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where
y [/3(1 + r)]i.
Substituting this expression into the budgetconstraint and solving for
first period saving (s = w- c1), we obtain
(1 + r)(w - m) + (w- m) s = (w - m) - l+r+y








It is then apparent that
ry
dwL(1+r)1_a)1+r+y)jdw
It follows that the sign of d5/dw is thesame as the sign of d/dw. But
dm(1+r+y)(1)
dw[(y - p)w + m(1-
which is positive if and only ifi < 1. Thus, as long as income replace-
ment during retirement is less than complete, theinterest elasticity of
saving rises with income.
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